Finding and connecting similar patterns of behavior throughout Islamic history is one of the most objective ways of determining whether something is or is not part of Muslim civilization.
Consider the issue of forced conversion in Islam, a phenomenon that has a long history with ample precedents. Indeed, from its inception, most of those who embraced Islam did so under duress, beginning with the Ridda wars and during the age of conquests, and to escape dhimmi status. This is a simple fact.
Yet, when one examines today's cases of forced conversions with those from centuries past, identical patterns emerge, demonstrating great continuity. Consider:
Days ago in Pakistan, two Christian men were severely beaten with iron rods and left for dead by a group of Muslims, simply because they refused to convert to Islam. According to Compass Direct News, they were returning from a church service when they were accosted by six Muslims. After they discovered they were Christian, the Muslims
then started questioning them about their faith and later tried to force them to recite the Kalma [Islamic conversion creed, "There is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is his messenger"] and become Muslims, telling them that this was the only way they could live peacefully in the city. They also offered monetary incentives and "protection" to Ishfaq and Naeem [the Christians], but the two refused to renounce Christianity.
"After cajoling the two Christians for some time," the Muslims pretended to go away, only to ram their car into the Christians: "The Muslims [then] got out of the car armed with iron rods and attacked Ishfaq and Naeem, shouting that they should either recite the Kalma or be prepared to die…severely beating[ing] the two Christians, fracturing Ishfaq Munawar's jaw and breaking five teeth, and seriously injuring Masih…. [T]he two Christians fell unconscious, and the young Muslim men left assuming they had killed them."
Contrast this contemporary account with the following anecdote from some 500 years past (excerpted from Witnesses for Christ, pgs.62-64):
In the year 1522, two Christian brothers in Ottoman Egypt were denounced by local Muslims "mostly out of jealousy and envy"; so the emir arrested them and "began flattering them and asking questions about their faith." The brothers made it clear that they were firm adherents of Christianity. "The Muslims in the audience became enraged with the brothers when they heard their answers, and they began screaming and demanding they must become Muslims." The brothers responded by refusing to "deny the faith we received from our forefathers, but we will remain unshaken and very firm in it until the end."
The Muslim judge deciding their case told the Christian brothers that if they simply said the Kalma and embraced Islam, they "would be given many honors and much glory"; otherwise, they would die. At that point, the brothers' mother came to support them, but "when the Muslims in court noticed her, they fell upon her, tore her clothing, and gave her a thorough beating."
After rebuking them for their savagery, the brothers reaffirmed that they would never deny Christianity for Islam, adding "behold our necks, do what you wish, but do it quickly."
Hearing this, one of the Muslims in the audience became so angry that he took out a knife and stabbed Kyrmidoles [one brother] in the chest, while someone else kicked him as hard as possible, and another dropped a large stone on his head. Finally, they plucked out his eyes. Thus Kyrmidoles died. As for Gabriel [his brother] they threw him to the ground and one of the soldiers severed his right shoulder and then proceeded and cut off his head.
Now, consider the near identical patterns in the two accounts, separated by half a millennium:
The Muslims first begin by talking to the Christians about their religion, suggesting they convert to Islam.
Failing to persuade the Christians, the Muslims proceed to "cajole" and offer "monetary incentives and protection" (in the modern case) and "flatter" and offer "many honors and much glory" (in the historic case). All that the Christians need do is speak some words, the Kalma, and become Muslim.
When the Christians still refuse, the Muslims fly into a savage rage, beating and torturing their victims to death (in the modern case, the Muslims assumed they had killed their victims).
Considering the Ottoman Empire and contemporary Pakistan are separated by culture, language, and some 500 years, how does one explain these identical patterns? What binds them together?
Only Islam—Islam empowered, Islam in charge; Muslim majorities governing, and thus abusing their non-Muslim minority. A fact of life, past and present.
Raymond Ibrahim, an Islam specialist and author of The Al Qaeda Reader, is a Shillman Fellow at the David Horowitz Freedom Center and an Associate Fellow at the Middle East Forum.
Send
Be the first of your friends to like this. In its final report of July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (commonly known as the 9/11 Commission) charged that Congress had failed America. In the commissioners' judgment, Congress had "adjusted slowly to the rise of transnational terrorism as a threat to national security. In particular, the growing threat and capabilities of [Osama] bin Laden were not understood in Congress … To the extent that terrorism did break through and engage the attention of the Congress as a whole, it would briefly command attention after a specific incident, and then return to a lower rung on the public policy agenda." Indeed, the commission was unequivocal about "Congress's slowness and inadequacy in treating the issue of terrorism in the years before 9/11."[1]
A 1991 report by the Republican task force provided intelligence not acted on for more than a decade by fingering "Sami ar-Rayan" as a U.S.-based Islamist. This was a reference to Sami al-Arian, a Palestinian professor in Florida who pleaded guilty in 2006 to a charge of conspiring to provide services to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
The commission was not alone in its indictment. Richard A. Clarke, former White House coordinator for counterterrorism under President Bill Clinton, asserted that "only after 9/11 did Congress muster the political will to strengthen the U.S. laws to fight terrorist financing and money laundering."[2] Paul Pillar, a former CIA official, noted that congressional interest in terrorism merely mirrored the public's interest, spiking after major terrorist incidents but waning shortly thereafter.[3]
But these critics were not entirely accurate. One small group of congressmen was undeserving of these admonishments. Working under the obscure banner of the Republican Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, a handful of legislators consistently warned of jihadist terrorism for more than a decade before the 9/11 attacks.
Task Force Origins
The story of U.S. aid to the Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s is well known. As author George Crile detailed in his book, Charlie Wilson's War, Rep. Charlie Wilson (Democrat, Texas) of the House Appropriations Committee championed an initiative to arm and fund these forces and repel the Soviet invasion.[4]
A lesser-known story was the supply of non-military aid, thanks to the efforts of Rep. Bill McCollum (Republican of Florida). With the help of his chief of staff, Vaughn Forrest, McCollum airlifted medical supplies to El Salvador, Thailand, Cambodia, Chad, Angola, Vietnam, and other conflict zones. The success of these "McCollum Airlifts" prompted the U.S. Agency for International Development to request in 1985 that a similar program be developed for Pakistan.[5]
Forrest also found a legal loophole that enabled the Pentagon to give away military surplus goods as humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan. He further discovered that Air Force reserve pilots could maintain flight proficiency levels by flying transport planes to Afghanistan.[6]
As McCollum's staff worked in Afghanistan and Pakistan, they cultivated a network of locals and expatriates, some of whom reported on radical, anti-Western elements,[7] alerting McCollum to new dangers among the mujahideen.[8]
By the end of 1988, the tide of the war had turned. Amid heavy losses, the Soviets began to withdraw from Afghanistan, and by May 15, 1989, they were gone. McCollum, however, did not join in the celebration. In a Washington Post op-ed, he boldly proclaimed that "something has gone terribly wrong with the war in Afghanistan."[9] Drawing from continuing reports on radicalism among the mujahideen, McCollum sought to warn the West. To this end, together with Rep. Duncan Hunter (Republican of California), the head of the Republican Research Committee, he created the ad-hoc Republican Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare.[10]
The aims of the task force were not immediately apparent. Congress did not fund it or provide it with offices. McCollum put Forrest in charge of the group and soon hired as its director Yossef Bodansky, a part-time academic from Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, who provided additional research.
In its first known report, issued on July 28, 1989, task force letterhead listed its members as Republican representatives Michael DeWine (Ohio), David O'Brien Martin (New York), Porter Goss (Florida), Jim Lightfoot (Iowa), Bob Livingston (Louisiana), Jack Buechner (Missouri), John G. Rowland (Connecticut), and Olympia Snowe (Maine). Also listed as cochairman was Dana Rohrabacher (California).[11] By the following year, the roster had changed so that only Goss, Livingston, and Snowe remained from the original letterhead. Joining them were Republican representatives William Broomfield (Michigan), Benjamin Gilman (New York), Robert Dornan (California), and Christopher Cox (California).[12]
Membership changed frequently in the early years. Inclusion simply signaled an active interest in the subject.[13] Members also contributed funds from their budgets for task force operations and reports.
The task force faxed its reports to more than 400 people, including members of the intelligence community, the White House, the State Department, Congress, and the media.[14] Staffers recall going from one member's office to another begging for boxes of paper to print the reports because the task force lacked funds, but even when the group printed enough reports, they often went unread.[15]
Part of the problem was the tone of the research. Analysis by the task force conveyed a sense of absolute certainty. Indeed, the reports rarely included caveats or even attributions. It was as if the task force was conveying immutable facts—a style typically avoided in intelligence reports, think tank analyses, and journalism.
Early Prescience
The task force reports, without exception, contained errors. But, if one can look past the errors, some of the early reports had remarkably prescient information.
The first report, titled "Trends in Afghanistan," warned that the "radical-revivalist Islamists, (the fundamentalists), who are the recipients of the bulk of U.S. aid, are actually involved in international terrorism aimed at the United States and its allies throughout the Islamic world." Should Washington fail to take note, the task force warned, "there will be unleashed a wave of terrorism aimed at the U.S."[16]
In another early report of February 28, 1990, titled "Saudi Arabia," the task force warned that "Afghan mujahideen and Arab Wahhabi activists, financed by Saudi money, have attempted to enforce their way of life … on rural populations in Afghanistan."[17]
A separate 1990 task force report titled "A Question of Trust," drew attention to Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar, the leader of the Islamist faction Hezb-i-Islami. It noted that he had received U.S. assistance in the 1980s and that his faction now posed a threat to U.S. interests in Afghanistan.[18] The task force was nearly thirteen years ahead of its time; in 2003, the U.S. Treasury designated Hekmatiyar for terrorist activity with al-Qaeda and the Taliban.[19]
A 1991 report on "Emerging Trends and Threats" emphasized the threat posed by Afghan mujahideen but also provided intelligence not acted on for more than a decade by fingering "Sami ar-Rayan" as a U.S.-based Islamist who attended an "Islamic Conference for Palestine" in 1989.[20] This was a reference to Sami al-Arian, a Palestinian professor in Florida who pleaded guilty in 2006 to a charge of conspiring to provide services to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.[21]
Additionally, in July 1992, the task force issued a report alleging that Tehran and Damascus were printing "nearly perfect" counterfeit U.S. currency to destabilize the U.S. economy while easing Iran's deficit. McCollum even displayed the currency at a press conference,[22] driving Iran's U.N. mission to lash out at the task force and its "wild hallucinations of the extreme right."[23] Later, however, the Treasury confirmed the task force's report, noting that, "excellent forgeries have turned up in the Middle East."[24]
On February 1, 1993, McCollum submitted an 80-page report for the Congressional Record titled "The New Islamist International."[25] It was an attempt to provide an overview of the jihadist movement, including an analysis of the "leadership and high command" of terrorists in Sudan where "the pan-Islamist movement has taken hold." While the report did not mention al-Qaeda, it did note the existence of an "international jihad organization." It identified the "most important figure" within that organization as the late Abdullah Azzam—later identified as al-Qaeda's cofounder—and also mentioned Ayman al-Zawahiri (al-Qaeda's future deputy leader), and Abdul Majid al-Zindani (finally designated by the U.S. Treasury in 2004 for "working with bin Laden, notably serving as one of his spiritual leaders. In this leadership capacity, he … played a key role in the purchase of weapons on behalf of al-Qaeda and other terrorists").[26]
Remarkably, the February report also warned of Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, "the spiritual guide of the most radical branch of Islamic Jihad in Egypt," who "arrived in the U.S. in the fall of 1990 and established an Islamist center … in Brooklyn, New York." It noted that Abdel Rahman was exploring the "possibility of terrorist operations" in the United States. [27] Although he was largely unknown at the time, Abdel Rahman would soon be arrested and later convicted for his role in a plan to plant five bombs in the New York City area.[28]
Task force member Benjamin Gilman is worthy of special mention. Even before the creation of this group, he demonstrated an abiding interest in counterterrorism legislation. He was among the most vocal advocates of the Domestic Antiterrorist Reward Act (HR 1241) in March 1993, raising the reward for leads in domestic terrorism cases from $500,000 to $2 million.[29] The program led to, among others, the 1995 capture of senior al-Qaeda operative Ramzi Yousef in Islamabad, Pakistan.[30]
Gilman also relentlessly pushed the State Department to reform. He hammered it for allowing Abdel Rahman into the United States on a tourist visa in 1990 and campaigned to have the department update its antiquated microfiche system.[31]
Finally, one cannot discuss the early years of the task force without addressing Yossef Bodansky's 1993 book, Target the West: Terrorism in the World Today, in which he argued that a new terror network, the Armed Islamic Movement, had emerged with "operational centers in Sudan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan."[32] Bodansky was clearly struggling to understand the nascent al-Qaeda network.
Perhaps the most notable passage appeared on page 15, which alleged that Tehran was training jihadists "to seize (or hijack) a transport aircraft. Then, trained air crews from among the terrorists would crash the airliner with its passengers into a selected objective."[33] This, of course, was a chilling description of the 9/11 plot eight years later.
Early Failures
But, as noted above, the task force reports were riddled with errors, some of which were spectacular. One example is the wildly inaccurate analysis of the 1990 crisis with Iraq. One report, "Some Speculations on Desert Warfare," erroneously predicted that war would "almost certainly cover the entire region" and that Saddam Hussein's forces would "defeat U.S.-led forces piecemeal."[34] Another falsely stated that "Iraq had already developed other nuclear weapons."[35] After U.S.-led forces routed Saddam, the task force erroneously warned of "spectacular strikes, including suicide attacks" in the United States.[36]
The task force released a 1992 report titled "Terrorism in the U.S.: Emerging Trends and the Florida Connection." It claimed, without attribution, that "Disney World … would make a visually spectacular and socially meaningful target" for terrorists.[37]
In 1993, the task force warned that a "new phase in an Islamist, terrorist campaign in the United States and overseas has been initiated." A report warned of attacks "by the Iranians and their Islamist allies" between March 17 and March 23, and then from March 25 through the end of the month, as the "most likely period for some terrorist attack to occur."[38] The attack, of course, never occurred.
In what may have been its most spectacular failure, the task force released a May 1993 report alleging that a terrorist network existed within a "radical [native] American Indian movement." It alleged that Libya provided aid to Native American allies, who in turn provided "shelter and hiding places to terrorist operatives on various reservations."[39]
These are just a few of the task force's many errors in the early years.
Under Fire
The task force also quickly began to accumulate enemies. In 1994, the Qur'anic Open University published a book titled Target Islam: Exposing the Malicious Conspiracy of Zionists against the World of Islam and Prominent Muslim Leaders. The book rebuked the task force for attempting to "maliciously link American Muslim organizations and individuals"[40] with the January 1993 World Trade Center attack. The Qur'anic Open University, by way of background, was headed by Sheikh Mubarik Ali Shah Gilani, who was later implicated—but not convicted—in the kidnapping and murder of Wall Street Journal journalist Daniel Pearl in Pakistan in 2002.[41]
Other Muslim groups lashed out at the task force for a report titled "Iran's European Springboard," which claimed that Tehran sent fighters to Bosnia to launch a European Islamist revolution and that Bosnian Muslims were slaughtering their own people as a ploy for world sympathy. The report alleged that "several key events, mostly strikes against civilians, that had galvanized public opinion and governments in the West to take bolder action in Bosnia-Herzegovina, were in fact 'staged' for the Western media by the Muslims themselves in order to dramatize the city's plight."[42]
In response to the report, in 1993, American Muslim Council director Abdurahman Alamoudi accused the group of "Muslim-bashing."[43] Eleven years later, Alamoudi would be sentenced by a federal court to twenty-three years in jail for plotting to assassinate the King of Saudi Arabia with financing and assistance from Libya.[44] At the time, however, his criticism was taken seriously. Rohrabacher resigned from the task force, registering his dissatisfaction with the report.[45] Representatives Snowe and Cox left shortly afterward.[46]
The task force soon stopped listing members on the letterhead. Listed beneath the seal of Congress and the title of the Republican Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare were only the names of Bill McCollum (chairman), Vaughn Forrest (chief of staff), Yossef Bodansky (director), and Donald Morrissey (legislative director).
The Alamoudi controversy did not help when task force members approached Rep. Charlie Rose (Democrat of North Carolina), then-House administration chairman, to create the Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare Caucus. This was an effort to transform the group into a recognized and bipartisan institution with a congressional budget.[47] In addition to the fallout from the Alamoudi scuffle, the intelligence community and the State Department reportedly bristled at the task force's attempts to challenge their authority. Rose eventually denied the request in July 1994.[48]
Early Attempts to Identify al-Qaeda
Despite its setbacks, the task force continued doggedly to try to understand the evolution of the jihadist movement. One 1994 report, titled "Islamist Terrorism and the Geneva Connection," identified Ayman al-Zawahiri as "one of the senior leaders of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad," who relocated "to Pakistan where he joined a fledgling international Islamist group in Peshawar."[49]
The task force produced another important report, which McCollum submitted for the Congressional Record, noting that "Arab volunteers continued to arrive in Peshawar" and that the "main Ikhwan [Muslim Brotherhood] facility is Maktaba-i-Khidamat (services offices), which was originally established by the late Shaykh Abd Allah Azzam."[50] Here the task force had fingered (using the Urdu spelling) the central clearinghouse for al-Qaeda in its early years—Maktab al-Khidamat.
Then, on November 2, 1994, the task force released a report titled "The Persian Gulf Redux." Though it did not identify him as a central figure, the report was one of Congress's earliest warnings about Osama bin Laden:
the Committee for Advice and Reform, a Saudi Islamist group closely affiliated with Khartoum, specifically condemned the establishment of the Higher Council for Islamic Affairs. In a statement signed by Osama bin Laden, the Committee accused Riyadh of "trying to deceive the public"… Bin Laden further accused Riyadh of attempting "to put an end to genuine Islam."[51]
New Leadership, Same Inconsistency
On January 4, 1995, the 104th Congress was sworn in, marking the first time Republicans controlled both houses since 1953.[52] The task force also underwent dramatic change. McCollum was appointed to the House Intelligence Committee, which prompted him to relinquish his chair. "I had access to secure things that I couldn't talk about," McCollum later said.[53] Task force members agreed that McCollum could assist the group's work from the inside.[54]
Rep. Jim Saxton (Republican of New Jersey) became the new chairman.[55] He approached his new position with vigor and took a more active interest in the research and writing involved in producing task force reports.[56]
The task force also drew interest from new members, including former actor and musician Sonny Bono (Republican of California), who was elected to represent California's 44th district in November 1994, and quickly became one of the members who contributed funds for task force salaries from their congressional budgets.[57] Gilman, who continued to press for State Department reform, had become chairman of the House International Affairs Committee.
The task force, despite these changes, continued to issue questionable reports. In February 1995, the group warned that "Iran-sponsored Islamist terrorists may soon strike in Washington D.C.—specifically the U.S. Congress and the White House."[58] As was the case with previous warnings, no such attack took place.
The group also issued questionable research following the April 19, 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, alleging that Islamists had carried out the attack when, in reality, the attack was homegrown. But on May 24 of that year, it also released a report titled "Recent Terrorist Conferences," warning of the activities of both bin Laden and Zawahiri.[59]
The task force also issued two responses to the bombings in the Saudi cities of Riyadh (1995) and Dhahran (1996) where it struggled to grasp the extent of al-Qaeda's involvement. However, it continued to call it the "Armed Islamic Movement" in one report,[60] and the "International HizbAllah" in another. The latter report unequivocally warned of the "rise in prominence of Osama bin Laden."[61]
Joint Economic Committee Years
In 1997, Saxton was named chairman of the Joint Economic Committee, whose primary task was to recommend improvements in economic policy. He only had until the end of 1998, as the chairmanship rotates between Democrats and Republicans every two years, but he inquired about putting his two task force staffers—Bodansky and Forrest—on the committee payroll under the assumption that "terror can have a significant impact on the economy."[62] In the end, he only secured sufficient funds for Forrest.[63] Bodansky continued to receive a salary pooled by task force members.[64]
On March 12, 1997, the task force issued "The Dhahran Bomb: Update," warning that "bin Laden and his allies have accelerated their preparations for the resumption of terrorist attacks against U.S. forces in the Middle East and elsewhere." It questionably described bin Laden's network as being wholly controlled by Iran but also cited an al-Quds al-Arabi article describing bin Laden's "fortified bases and headquarters in the mountains … in the Tora Bora military base of Nangarhar province."[65] Tora Bora was, of course, the scene of heavy fighting after the U.S.-led coalition invaded Afghanistan in December 2001 and where bin Laden escaped via underground caves.[66]
At around this time, the task force came under attack again from an American Muslim group. An April 10 article in an Arab newspaper quoted Nihad Awad of the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) as stating that "the congressmen who provide public funds to support this task force need to explain to their constituents why hard-earned tax dollars are being wasted on inflammatory reports." He claimed that Bodansky had made "a career out of bashing Islam and Muslims."[67] Thus, the task force had again drawn the ire of a Muslim group later tied to terrorism. Indeed, the U.S. government identified CAIR in 2007 as an "un-indicted coconspirator" in United States vs. Holy Land Foundation, a Hamas terrorism finance case.[68]
Gilman, in the meantime, had become fixated on the threat of the Taliban. He and former task force member Dana Rohrabacher publically and repeatedly challenged the Clinton administration's official policies toward the Taliban.[69] He was central in the congressional effort to condemn the Taliban. In 1998, he warned of a "new kind of adversary, one that draws its power from a convergence of the destructive tactics of international terrorism and radical Muslim extremism with one of the world's largest heroin empires." He warned that "bin Laden is only the tip of the iceberg and removing him will not end the threat … from Muslim terrorist extremists." [70]
Bodansky's Book
Following the 1998 twin embassy bombings in Africa, bin Laden had unquestionably become a household name in the United States. Capitalizing on Americans' interest in the Saudi-born terrorist, Bodansky released Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America.[71] He, however, declined to provide source footnotes for his text of more than 400 pages. Thus, as one reviewer later noted, "Bodansky leaves the veracity of many of his claims to ride on his name alone."[72] This, coupled with the lack of caveats and qualifiers (similar to the style of task force reports), weakened the book's credibility.
Still, no other analyst had attempted what Bodansky had done. His book described bin Laden as a "cog, albeit an important one, in a large system that will outlast his own demise."[73] He further identified the existence of what is now recognized as al-Qaeda, though referred to it by the name used in task force reports: the "Armed Islamic Movement." He noted that "under the leadership of bin Laden, Zawahiri, and their colleagues, the Islamist terrorist system continues to expand."[74] In the end, Bodansky's book was filled with both errors and worthwhile analysis, but it came out at a time when the public knew precious little about Islamist terrorism.
By this time, in early 1999, Saxton had rotated out of the position of chairman of the Joint Economic Committee. Forrest attempted to stay on as a staffer, but he recalled that "the chairman was opposed to having me continue."[75] Forrest left and founded the Higgins Counterterrorism Center along with defense analyst Peter Leitner. After Forrest's departure, the task force continued to operate on a shoestring budget. Bodansky, according to staffers, worked out of a tiny room, a converted broom closet, down the hall from Saxton's office.[76]
Special Panel (1999-2000)
In May 1999, House Speaker Dennis Hastert (Republican of Illinois) named Saxton as chair to a new Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism. Saxton expressed his delight in presiding over "an official entity."[77] Bodansky, however, did not receive an official position on the special panel; he remained an advisor to Saxton and the sole employee of the task force.[78]
Saxton's panel held its first hearing on the threat of biological, nuclear, and cyber terrorism. It included testimony on the threat of an electromagnetic pulse attack, in which a nuclear warhead could be detonated high above the Earth's surface, causing permanent damage to electrical systems on the ground. The panel also featured an expert on cyberterrorism, a new and growing field in the age of the Internet.[79] Saxton, the ambitious chairman, held five more panels on terrorism-related topics in subsequent weeks.[80] One, titled "Terrorism and Threats to U.S. Interests in Latin America," featured Elliott Abrams, who later served as deputy national security advisor during President George W. Bush's second term.[81]
As Saxton enjoyed his newfound success, however, his task force predecessor fell on hard times. In November 2000, the founder of the task force, Bill McCollum, relinquished his House seat to run for the Senate but lost.[82] After two decades of service (he began in 1981), McCollum's time in Congress had ended.
Countdown to 9/11
In the lead up to the September 11, 2001 attacks, terrorism remained a relatively high-profile subject in Congress after the lingering shock of the 1998 twin embassy bombings in Africa and the 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole. Senior intelligence officials provided regular briefings on Capitol Hill, and Saxton continued to raise awareness through the newly created Special Oversight Panel.
Gilman, for his part, continued to warn of the Taliban. The Islamist government had destroyed two ancient statues of Buddha and forced Hindus to wear a yellow symbol on their clothes as a means to identify them as non-Muslim.[83] Other legislators, alarmed by a tactic used by the Nazis in World War II, joined him in his campaign.
The task force, according to staffers, continued to operate but did so primarily in the form of briefings. Saxton and Bodansky reportedly met with various decision-makers and analysts around Washington to generate awareness, but the analytical output had slowed.
Finally, seeking to devote more time to the oversight panel, Saxton handed off the chairmanship of the task force to Eric Cantor (Republican of Virginia) on April 1, 2001. Cantor, not yet forty years old, was a freshman representative with a vivid interest in counterterrorism.[84] According to the public record, Bodansky's salary that year came from the budgets of representatives Cantor, Hunter, and Tom DeLay (Republican of Texas), then House majority whip, among others.[85]
The Attack and its Aftermath
On the morning of September 11, 2001, Jim Saxton got to work early and received a telephone call informing him that his father had passed away. The grieving Saxton called his longtime colleague, Duncan Hunter, who came to the office to console him.
That same morning, nineteen al-Qaeda operatives hijacked four commercial airliners filled with passengers and carried out the most devastating terrorist attack in U.S. history. Predictably, the congressional record on September 12 is filled with fiery reactions even from legislators with little understanding of who had attacked Americans, or why.
The task force, now under Cantor, issued a release stating that "the terrorist attacks are an act of war. Therefore, retribution must be swift, sure, and overwhelming. But retribution is not enough. In war, one must destroy the enemy's ability to wage war ... It is only through the destruction of international terrorism's supportive infrastructure that attacks like this can be prevented and terrorists emasculated."[86]
Saxton asked how the United States could prevent this from ever happening again. He offered five specific suggestions, including restructuring the intelligence community. Gilman called for similar reforms, calling on Congress to "review all of our policies toward international terrorism, our airport security, and our intelligence capability."[87] He later joined President George W. Bush to view the wreckage at Ground Zero.
Bodansky was soon in high demand. Television, radio, and newspaper audiences wanted to hear about this Saudi, who had engineered the most devastating terrorist attack in the country's history. Bodansky, author of Bin Laden: the Man Who Declared War on America, was uniquely positioned to fit that role.
In 2002, Duncan Hunter was named chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. He, in turn, created the Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities Subcommittee, and placed it in Saxton's hands.[88] Saxton recalled that "after 9/11, some members [of Congress] quietly came up to me and gave us credit for what we did in the hallway." He was also invited to Vice President Dick Cheney's office, which sought information about bin Laden's potential use of weapons of mass destruction.[89]
Shifting Sands
On November 26, 2002, the 9/11 Commission first met to prepare a report on the September 11 attacks, the lapses in intelligence that enabled them to take place, and the role of the various arms of the government to prevent terrorism in the future. Its members, headed by former New Jersey governor Thomas Kean, included former representatives Lee Hamilton (Democrat of Indiana) and Timothy Roemer (Democrat of Indiana), along with former senators Bob Kerrey (Democrat of Nebraska) and Slade Gorton (Republican of Washington).[90] Notably, the commission invited not one member of the task force.
Gilman, after three distinguished decades in Congress, retired in January 2003. Saxton and Hunter, however, continued to bring attention to the threat of terrorism through the hearings of the House Armed Services Committee. Saxton's role as chairman of the Subcommittee of Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities kept him particularly busy. He traveled to Iraq in 2003 and Afghanistan in 2005. As one staffer recalled, his passion was funding the elite counterterrorism forces of the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM).[91]
The task force survived, but with institutes specializing in terrorism popping up all over Washington, members were losing interest. Cantor, Hunter, Saxton, and DeLay pooled their funds, but the records show that the amount dropped each year. [92] Bodansky lists his last year on the task force as 2004.[93]
Thus, after fifteen years, the Republican Task Force effectively dissolved. Cantor still proudly noted his affiliation with the group, stating that it was "composed of members of Congress who study the threat of international terrorism on the United States and develop policy proposals and legislative recommendations regarding the fight against terrorism."[94] However, the task force today does not maintain an official online presence, and there is no public record of its roster.
The 9/11 Report
On July 22, 2004, the 9/11 Commission released its report and charged that Congress had failed to respond to the threat of transnational terror. It made no mention of the task force or its members. On August 3, The Miami Herald reported that McCollum, then campaigning for Senate, "generally endorsed" the commission's findings.[95] "No, we weren't acknowledged," he said. "But the point was to identify the failures … I thought the report from that perspective was pretty accurate. I suppose I was used to the task force not being recognized."[96]
Forrest was less forgiving. He stated later that it was "mind-boggling that the 9/11 Commission didn't talk to me, Saxton, McCollum, or the others."[97]
Saxton, for his part, continued to raise awareness of terrorism, writing articles for The Washington Times[98] and The National Interest.[99] He also remained chair of the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Unconventional Threats, holding hearings on U.S. strategy in the "Global War on Terror" and other relevant topics. He spent three more years in Congress, then retired in January 2009, the same year as Hunter.
For the Record
The legislative record demonstrates that the Republican Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare was undeserving of the 9/11 Report's admonishments. Thousands of pages of task force reports and statements incontrovertibly testify to this.
One 9/11 Report staffer later recalled that "the commission did not bring the same amount of resources, attention, or focus to investigation into the performance of the legislative branch." In fact, the commission "was divided into nine teams, and Congress was not the focus of any of them. It was a last-minute look."[100]
To be fair, the task force reports were not easy to find. Even the Library of Congress does not have them on file. As one archivist explained, the library would not collect the reports because they were not released by the Government Press Office and were not official publications. Moreover, because of their Republican identification, the archivists may have determined the reports were partisan, and therefore, elected not to collect them.[101] The many errors in the task force reports may have been a factor, too.
Until 2007, only a few of its earlier documents could be found online. Then, Peter Leitner and his son Richard, released Unheeded Warnings: The Lost Reports of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare. So the reports had not exactly been lost. Leitner requested them in 2006 from Saxton, who gladly complied.
The record clearly shows that the task force cannot be credited with conveying a clear view of the threat during the 1990s. Indeed, the reports were as erroneous as they were prescient. From warning of Libyan-inspired terrorists among Native Americans, to foretelling attacks on a Florida theme park, the task force was often more wrong than right. Yet the group's members should be credited for their tenacious work to understand al-Qaeda and its affiliates at a time when almost no one else did.
On the tenth anniversary of those devastating attacks, the group deserves praise for mustering all the resources it could to warn the public of the looming dangers. At the very least, its efforts were worthy of mention in the 9/11 Commission's report.
Jonathan Schanzer is vice president of research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
[1] The 9/11 Commission Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), pp. 104-6.
[2] Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (New York: Free Press, 2004), p. 195.
[3] Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), pp. 20, 204-5.
[4] George Crile, Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story of How the Wildest Man in Congress and a Rogue CIA Agent Changed the History of Our Times (New York: Grove Press, 2003), pp. 33-114.
[5] Author's interview with Peter Leitner, Pentagon City, Va., June 9, 2009.
[6] Ibid.
[7] The Hill (Washington, D.C.), Nov. 26, 2003.
[8] Phone interview with Bill McCollum, Sept. 29, 2005.
[9] Bill McCollum, "Afghan Endgame: The CIA Has Bungled It," The Washington Post, Sept. 10, 1989.
[10] The Hill, Nov. 26, 2003.
[11] "Trends in Afghanistan," Republican Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, July 28, 1989, Hoover Institution library, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.
[12] "National Security Advisory," Republican Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, Jan. 29, 1991, Hoover Institution library.
[13] Author interview with Donald Morrissey, Washington, D.C., June 19, 2009.
[14] Author interview with James Geoffrey, Washington, D.C., June 12, 2009.
[15] Author interview with Scott Brenner, Washington, D.C., June 22, 2009.
[16] "Trends in Afghanistan," July 28, 1989.
[17] Richard J. Leitner and Peter M. Leitner, Unheeded Warnings: The Lost Reports of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, vol. II (Washington, D.C.: Crossbow Books, 2009), pp. 166-8.
[18] "A Question of Trust," Republican Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, Mar. 1, 1990, private library of Rosanne Klass, New York City.
[19] "Alphabetical Listing of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons" (SDN list), Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Washington, D.C., accessed July 11, 2011.
[20] Leitner and Leitner, Unheeded Warnings, vol. 1, p. 336.
[21] "Sami al-Arian Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Provide Services to Palestinian Islamic Jihad," Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., Apr. 17, 2006.
[22] Author interview with Scott Brenner, June 22, 2009.
[23] The Independent (London), July 3, 1992.
[24] Moneyclips (San Angelo, Tex.), July 2, 1992.
[25] Leitner and Leitner, Unheeded Warnings, vol. I, pp. 102-91; excerpts at "The New Islamist International," The Republican Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, Feb. 1, 1993.
[26] "United States Designates bin Laden Loyalist," U.S. Department of the Treasury, Washington, D.C., Feb. 24, 2004.
[27] Leitner and Leitner, Unheeded Warnings, vol. I, pp. 102-91; excerpts at "The New Islamist International," The Republican Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, Feb. 1, 1993.
[28] The New York Times, Jan. 18, 1996.
[29] Gerald Solomon, speaking in support of the "Domestic Antiterrorist Reward Act of 1993," H1035, House of Representatives, Congressional Record, Mar. 4, 1993.
[30] CNN, Mar. 1, 2003; for more on Yousef, see Simon Reeve, The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1999).
[31] Benjamin Gilman, "Time to Slam the Door on Terrorists," U.S. House of Representatives, Congressional Record, 103rd Congress (1993-94), Washington, D.C., May 11, 1993, p. E1207.
[32] Yossef Bodansky, Target the West: Terrorism in the World Today (New York: S.P.I. Books, 1993), pp. xv.
[33] Ibid., p. 15.
[34] Leitner and Leitner, Unheeded Warnings, vol. 1, pp. 312-7.
[35] "Iraq's Other Bomb," Republican Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, Nov. 28, 1990, Hoover Institution library.
[36] Leitner and Leitner, Unheeded Warnings, vol. 1, pp. 42-4.
[37] Ibid., pp. 380-9.
[38] Ibid., pp. 403-5.
[39] Ibid., pp. 429-33, report titled, "Terrorism and the Radical American Indian Movement: The Unexpected Connection."
[40] The New York Times News Service, Jan. 10, 2002; The Baltimore Sun, Jan. 10, 2002.
[41] Mira L. Boland, "Sheikh Gilani's American Disciples," The Weekly Standard, Mar. 18, 2002.
[42] Yossef Bodansky and Vaughn S. Forrest, "Iran's European Springboard?" Republican Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, Sept. 1, 1992.
[43] Greg Noakes, "Republican Task Force Faces Backlash on Bosnia Report," Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, July/Aug. 1993, p. 30.
[44] "Abdurahman Alamoudi Sentenced to Jail in Terrorism Financing Case," U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., Oct. 15, 2004.
[45] Author telephone interview with Dana Rohrabacher, June 26, 2009.
[46] Noakes, "Republican Task Force Faces Backlash on Bosnia Report," p. 30; National Catholic Reporter, Mar. 19, 1993.
[47] Roll Call (Washington, D.C.), Jan. 20, 1994.
[48] Ibid., July 11, 1994.
[49] "Islamist Terrorism and the Geneva Connection," Republican Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, Mar. 14, 1994, accessed Aug. 13, 2010. This link has since been removed.
[50] Bill McCollum, "Pakistan Supports Terrorist Rebels in Kashmir—By Yossef Bodansky and Vaughn S. Forrest," House of Representatives, Congressional Record, June 22, 1994, p. E1296.
[51] Leitner and Leitner, Unheeded Warnings, vol. 2, pp. 364-5.
[52] Laurence M. Vance, "What a Republican Majority Has Not Meant," Future of Freedom Foundation, Fairfax, Va. Sept. 29, 2004.
[53] Author telephone interviews with Bill McCollum, Sept. 29, 2005, Jan. 16, 2010.
[54] Author telephone interview with Vaughn S. Forrest, Jan. 13, 2010.
[55] Author interview with James Geoffrey, June 12, 2009.
[56] Author telephone interview with Mark O'Connell, July 22, 2009.
[57] Author telephone interview with Gary Gallant, July 16, 2009; Report of the Clerk of the House, 1996 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997).
[58] Leitner and Leitner, Unheeded Warnings, vol. 1, pp. 509-12.
[59] Ibid., pp. 245-52.
[60] Ibid., pp. 533, 547, 567.
[61] Ibid., pp. 573-8.
[62] Author telephone interview with Jim Saxton, July 24, 2009.
[63] Author telephone interview with Vaughn Forrest, Jan. 14, 2010.
[64] Author telephone interview with anonymous Joint Economic Committee staffer, Sept. 3, 2009.
[65] Leitner and Leitner, Unheeded Warnings, vol. 1, pp. 579-83.
[66] The Washington Post, Apr. 17, 2002.
[67] Al-Nashra (Fairfax, Va.), Dec. 23, 1998.
[68] The New York Sun, June 4, 2007.
[69] Dana Rohrabacher, "9/11 Represented a Dramatic Failure of Policy and People," House of Representatives, June 21, 2003.
[70] Benjamin Gilman, "The Taliban: Protectors of Terrorists, Producers of Drugs," H. Con. Res. 336, House of Representatives, Congressional Record, Oct. 8, 1998, p. E1989.
[71] New York: Prima Publishing, 1999.
[72] Ali Asadullah, "Book Review: Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America," Islam Online, Nov. 4, 2001.
[73] Bodansky, Bin Laden, p. 406.
[74] Ibid., p. 404.
[75] Author telephone interview with Vaughn Forrest, Jan. 14, 2010.
[76] Author telephone interview with Mark O'Connell, July 22, 2009.
[77] Author telephone interview with Jim Saxton, Dec. 15, 2009.
[78] Author telephone interview with Jim Saxton, Sept. 4, 2009.
[79] "Terrorist Threats to the United States," Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism, House Committee on Armed Services, Washington, D.C., May 23, 2000.
[80] "Terrorism and Threats to U.S. Interests in the Middle East," Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism, House Committee on Armed Services, Washington, D.C., July 13, 2000.
[81] "Terrorism and Threats to U.S. Interests in Latin America," Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism, House Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C., June 29, 2000.
[82] The Hill, Nov. 26, 2003.
[83] "Afghan People vs. The Taliban," hearing before the House Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights, House Committee on International Relations, Washington, D.C., Oct. 31, 2001.
[84] Author telephone interview with Jim Saxton, Sept. 4, 2009.
[85] "Yossef Bodansky, Congressional Staffer — Salary Data," LegiStorm, Washington, D.C., accessed July 1, 2011.
[86] Congressional Task Force press release, Sept. 12, 2001, cited in Media Matters Action Network, May 5, 2010.
[87] S. J. Resolution 22, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C., Sept. 12, 2001.
[88] Author telephone interview with Jim Saxton, July 24, 2009.
[89] Ibid.
[90] "Biographical Information: Commission Members," National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Washington, D.C., accessed June 14, 2011.
[91] Author telephone interview with Tom Hawley, Jan. 6, 2010.
[92] "Yossef Bodansky, Congressional Staffer—Salary Data."
[93] "The Boards of the Global Panel Foundations," accessed June 14, 2011.
[94] "About Eric," Eric Cantor website, accessed June 14, 2011.
[95] The Miami Herald, Aug. 3, 2004.
[96] Author telephone interview with Bill McCollum, Jan. 16, 2010.
[97] Author telephone interview with Vaughn Forrest, Jan. 13, 2010.
[98] Jim Saxton, "Confronting Complacency," The Washington Times, July 29, 2005.
[99] Jim Saxton, "Reshaping Our Iran Policy," The National Interest, Jan. 3, 2007; idem, "Finally, An Iranian Containment Strategy," The National Interest, Jan. 26, 2007.
[100] Author telephone interview with anonymous former 9/11 Commission staffer, Jan. 13, 2010.
[101] Interview with archivist, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Dec. 16, 2009.
To anyone familiar with Muslim doctrine, Pfc. Naser Jason Abdo's actions — from refusing to deploy to Afghanistan lest he kill fellow Muslims to plotting a terror attack to kill fellow Americans — make perfect sense and accord well with Islam's dichotomous doctrine of wala wa bara, often translated as "loyalty and enmity."
Built atop numerous Koran verses and backed by Sharia, wala requires Muslims to be loyal to fellow Muslims, and explains why Abdo refused to deploy to Muslim nations.
While loyalty may appear admirable, it has a flipside, bara, which requires Muslims to disassociate themselves from non-Muslims — to be disloyal to them (see al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri's 60 page treatise titled "Loyalty and Enmity" in The Al Qaeda Reader for details).
For example, Koran 5:51 literally warns Muslims against "taking the Jews and Christians as friends and allies … whoever among you takes them for friends and allies, he is surely one of them," i.e., he becomes an infidel; 58:22 states that true Muslims do not befriend non-Muslims — "even if they be their fathers, sons, brothers, or kin."
Now consider the progress of Abdo and how his actions reveal great doctrinal consistency:
First, he objected to participating in any war in any Muslim country, claiming "conscientious objector" status:
I don't believe I can involve myself in an army that wages war against Muslims. I don't believe I could sleep at night if I take part, in any way, in the killing of a Muslim. … I can't deploy with my unit to Afghanistan and participate in the war — I can't both deploy and be a Muslim.
He would not be the first to object to combating fellow Muslims: Major Nidal Hasan, who went on a shooting spree in Fort Hood in 2009, killing thirteen —and who Abdo heroizes — considered himself to be "a Muslim first and an American second"; the idea of deploying to a Muslim nation, his "worst nightmare," threw him "over the edge." Then there was Sergeant Hasan Akbar, who killed two American soldiers and wounded fourteen in Kuwait "because he was concerned U.S. troops would kill fellow Muslims in Iraq."
Next, though Abdo had no problem openly evincing loyalty to Muslims, trusting that tolerant or sentimental Americans would indulge him, he hid his enmity and disloyalty for those same Americans, in accordance to taqiyya — a doctrine that permits Muslims to deceive infidels. In fact, the Koran's primary justification for deception is in the context of "loyalty and enmity":
Let believers not take for friends and allies infidels [non-Muslims] instead of believers. Whoever does this shall have no relationship left with Allah — unless you but guard yourselves against them, taking precautions (3:2.
Mainstream Muslim reference Tabari interprets this verse thusly:
Only when you are in their [non-Muslims'] power, fearing for yourselves, are you to demonstrate friendship for them with your tongues, while harboring hostility toward them. But do not join them in the particulars of their infidelities, and do not aid them through any action against a Muslim.
Accordingly, while Abdo did not aid Americans against Muslims, he certainly made use of his tongue: to support his "conscientious objector" status, he pointed to "the peace that Islam preaches"; he claimed that he wanted to fight "Islamophobia" and "put a good positive spin out there that Islam is a good, peaceful religion"; and though he tried to murder Americans by emulating the Fort Hood massacre, Abdo originally condemned it, calling it "an act of aggression by a man and not by Islam," insisting that it ran against his beliefs as a Muslim.
Even so, anyone reading between the lines should have noticed his enmity: like Hasan before him, who made no secret of his hatred for infidels in statements in front of classmates, Abdo also made anti-American remarks in class.
Unfortunately, few Americans are aware of doctrines like wala wa bara and taqiyya; worse, they often project their own beliefs and values — from Christianity to secular humanism—onto Islam and Muslims.
For instance, Western people associate piety and religious observance with peace and goodwill: as with Hasan before him — who was described as an "observant Muslim who prayed daily" and "very serious about his religion" — acquaintances shocked at Abdo's terror plot argue that he was "very devoutly religious."
Yet, the fact is there is no inconsistency between piety and prayer on the one hand, and jihad and deceit on the other: all are equally codified in Sharia. Moreover, upholding one doctrine often leads to upholding another: thus loyalty to fellow Muslims is a sure sign of disloyalty to non-Muslims.
Raymond Ibrahim, a widely published author on Islam, is a Shillman Journalism Fellow at the David Horowitz Freedom Center and an Associate Fellow at the Middle East Forum. To receive all his writings, sign up to his free mailing list.
From a novel by Salman Rushdie published in 1989 to an American civil protest called
"Everyone Draw Muhammad Day" in 2010, a familiar pattern has evolved. It begins when
Westerners say or do something critical of Islam. Islamists respond with name-calling and
outrage, demands for retraction, threats of lawsuits and violence, and actual violence. In turn,
Westerners hem and haw, prevaricate, and finally fold. Along the way, each controversy
prompts a debate focusing on the issue of free speech.
I shall argue two points about this sequence. First, that the right of Westerners to discuss,
criticize, and even ridicule Islam and Muslims has eroded over the years. Second, that free
speech is a minor part of the problem; at stake is something much deeper – indeed, a defining
question of our time: will Westerners maintain their own historic civilization in the face of assault
by Islamists, or will they cede to Islamic culture and law and submit to a form of second-class
citizenship?
The cover of the book that prompted the Rushdie Rules.
The era of Islamist uproar began abruptly on February 14, 1989, when Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini, Iran's supreme leader, watched on television as Pakistanis responded with violence
to a new novel by Salman Rushdie, the famous writer of South Asian Muslim origins. His book's
very title, The Satanic Verses, refers to the Koran and poses a direct challenge to Islamic
sensibilities; its contents further exacerbate the problem. Outraged by what he considered
Rushdie's blasphemous portrait of Islam, Khomeini issued an edict whose continued impact
makes it worthy of quotation at length:
I inform all zealous Muslims of the world that the author of the book entitled The Satanic
Verses – which has been compiled, printed, and published in opposition to Islam, the Prophet,
and the Koran – and all those involved in the publication who were aware of its contents, are
sentenced to death.
I call upon all zealous Muslims to execute them quickly, wherever they may be found, so that no
one else will dare to insult the Muslim sanctities. God willing, whoever is killed on this path is a
martyr.
In addition, anyone who has access to the author of this book but does not possess the power
to execute him should report him to the people so that he may be punished for his actions.
This unprecedented edict – no head of government had ever called for the execution of a
novelist living in another country – came out of the blue and surprised everyone, from Iranian
government officials to Rushdie himself. No one had imagined that a magical realist novel,
replete with people falling out of the sky and animals that talk, might incur the wrath of the ruler
of Iran, a country to which Rushdie had few connections.
The edict led to physical attacks on bookstores in Italy, Norway, and the United States and on
translators of The Satanic Verses in Norway, Japan, and Turkey; in the last case, the translator
and 36 others perished in an arson attack on a hotel. Other violence in Muslim-majority
countries led to more than 20 fatalities, mostly in South Asia. Then, just as the furor wound
down, in June 1989, Khomeini died; his death made the edict, sometimes inaccurately called a
fatwa, immutable.
The edict contains four important elements. First, by noting "opposition to Islam, the Prophet,
and the Koran," Khomeini delineated the wide range of sacred topics that may not be treated
disrespectfully without invoking a death sentence.
Second, by targeting "all those involved in the publication who were aware of its contents," he
declared war not just on the artist but also on an entire cultural infrastructure – including the
thousands of employees of publishing houses, advertisers, distribution companies, and
bookstores.
Third, by ordering Rushdie's execution "so that no one else will dare to insult the Muslim
sanctities," Khomeini made clear his purpose not only to punish one writer but also to prevent
further instances of ridicule.
Finally, by demanding that those unable to execute Rushdie "report him," Khomeini called on
every Muslim worldwide to become part of an informal intelligence network dedicated to
upholding Islamic sanctities.
These four features together constitute what I call the Rushdie Rules. Two decades later, they
remain very much in place.
The edict set several precedents in the West. A foreign political leader successfully ignored
conventional limits on state powers. A religious leader at will intervened directly, with little cost
or resistance, in Western cultural affairs. And a Muslim leader established the precedent of
applying an aspect of Islamic law, the Shari'a, in an overwhelmingly non-Muslim country. On
this last point: Western states have, at times, served as Khomeini's effective agents. The
government of Austria imposed a suspended prison sentence on a person who defied the
Rushdie Rules, while the governments of France and Australia brought charges that could have
meant jail time. Most strikingly, authorities in Canada, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Finland,
and Israel actually jailed Rushdie-Rule trespassers. It takes effort to recall the innocent days
before 1989, when Westerners freely spoke and wrote about Islam and related subjects.
The Rushdie Rules had an immediate impact on Muslims living in the West, whose outbursts of
insults and violence generated a newfound sense of power. From Sweden to New Zealand,
Islamists responded with joy that, after centuries on the defensive, Muslims had found their
voice and, from the belly of the beast, could challenge the West. Most of the violence that
followed was of the indiscriminate sort, on the model of 9/11, Bali, Madrid, Beslan, and
London, in which jihadists killed whoever happened to cross their paths;
TheReligionOfPeace.com documents on average five indiscriminate Islamist terrorist attacks per
day around the world.
Less common but more intimidating is the violence that targets those who defy the Rushdie
Rules. Let us limit examples of this phenomenon to one country, Denmark. In October 2004, an
instructor at the Carsten Niebuhr Institute at the University of Copenhagen was kicked and hit
by several strangers as he left the university. They informed him that he had read from the
Koran, which as an infidel (kafir) he had no right to do. In October 2005, Jyllands-Posten
editor Flemming Rose was threatened for having commissioned cartoons depicting Muhammad.
Two of the cartoonists had to go into hiding. One of them, Kurt Westergaard, subsequently
narrowly escaped physical attack inside his home. In March 2006, Naser Khader, an anti-
Islamist politician, was threatened by an Islamist who warned that if Khader became a
government minister, he and his ministry would be blown up.
The Danish experience is typical. According to the Wall Street Journal, "Across Europe,
dozens of people are now in hiding or under police protection because of threats from Muslim
extremists." Even Pope Benedict XVI received a flurry of threats in the aftermath of his quoting
a Byzantine emperor on the subject of Islam. In the Netherlands alone, politicians reported 121
death threats against them in just one year. The November 2004 execution on an Amsterdam
street of Theo van Gogh – a well known libertarian, filmmaker, talk show host, newspaper
columnist, and mischief-maker who had ridiculed Islam – traumatized his country and led to a
brief state of insurrection.
Westerners generally perceive this violence as a challenge to their right to self-expression. But if
freedom of speech is the battlefield, the greater war concerns the foundational principles of
Western civilization. The recurrent pattern of Islamist uproar exists to achieve three goals – not
always articulated – that go well beyond prohibiting criticism of Islam.
A first goal consists of establishing a superior status for Islam. Khomeini's demands for the
sacred trinity of "Islam, the Prophet, and the Koran" imply special privileges for one religion, an
exclusion from the hurly-burly of the marketplace of ideas. Islam would benefit from unique
rules unavailable to other religions. Jesus may be sacrilegiously lampooned in Monty Python's
Life of Brian or Terry McNally's Corpus Christi, but, as one book's title puts it, "be careful
with Muhammad!"
This segues to a second goal – Muslim supremacy and Western inferiority. Islamists routinely
say and do things more offensive to Westerners than anything Westerners do vis-à-vis Muslims.
They openly despise Western culture; in the words of an Algerian Islamist, it's not a civilization,
but a "syphilization." Their mainstream media publishes coarser, viler, and more violent cartoons
than anything commissioned by Flemming Rose. They freely insult Judaism, Christianity,
Hinduism, and Buddhism. They murder Jews just for being Jews, like Daniel Pearl in Pakistan,
Sébastian Sellam and Ilan Halimi in France, and Pamela Waechter and Ariel Sellouk in the
United States. Whether because of fear or inattention, Westerners assent to an imbalance
whereby Muslims may offend and attack while they themselves are shielded from any such
indignities or pains.
Should Westerners accept this imbalance, the dhimmi status will follow. This Islamic concept
permits "people of the book," monotheists such as Christians and Jews, to continue to practice
their religion under Muslim rule, subject to many restrictions. For its time, the dhimmi status
offered certain benefits (until as recently as 1945, Jews generally had better lives in Islamdom
than in Christendom), but it is intended to insult and humiliate non-Muslims, even as it exalts
Muslims' superiority. Dhimmis pay additional taxes, may not join the military or the government,
and suffer from encompassing legal disabilities. In some times and places, dhimmis could ride
on a donkey but not on a horse, wore distinctive clothing, and an elderly dhimmi on the street
was required to jump out of the way of a Muslim child. Elements of the dhimmi status have
recently been applied in such varied places as Gaza, the West Bank, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Clearly, Londonistan and beyond are also
in their sights.
In turn, re-establishing the dhimmi status is one step toward the Islamist's third and ultimate
ambition, applying full Shari'a law. Closing down discussion of Islam paves the way toward this
end. Conversely, retaining free speech about Islam represents a critical defense against the
imposition of an Islamic order. Keeping our civilization requires open discussion of Islam.
The Shari'a regulates both private and public life. The private dimension includes such intensely
personal matters as bodily cleanliness, sexuality, childbearing, family relations, clothing, and diet.
In the public realm, the Shari'a regulates social relations, commercial transactions, criminal
penalties, the status of women and minorities, slavery, the identity of the ruler, the judiciary,
taxation, and warfare. In brief, Islamic law includes everything from toilet etiquette to the
conduct of warfare.
Yet the Shari'a contradicts the deepest premises of Western civilization. The unequal relations of
male and female, of Muslim and kafir, of owner and slave cannot be reconciled with equality of
rights. The harem cannot be reconciled with a monogamous order. Islamic supremacism
contradicts freedom of religion. A sovereign God cannot allow democracy.
Islamists all concur on the goal of applying Islamic law globally. But they differ on whether to
achieve this through violence (the preference of bin Laden), totalitarian rule (Khomeini), or by
politically gaming the system (the Swiss intellectual Tariq Ramadan). However done, were
Islamists to achieve a Shar'i order, they would effectively replace Western civilization with
Islamic civilization. In American terms, allowing the Koran to trump the Constitution ends the
United States as it has existed for more than two centuries.
The Muslim Council of Britain wishes to transform schools in the United Kingdom.
Accepting the Rushdie Rules, in other words, implies a process that culminates with full
application of the Shari'a. Were Khomeini to have his way, those of us who value Western
civilization could not argue against Shari'a. To understand the consequences of closing the
debate about Islam, note what appears to be an innocuous report published in 2007 by the
Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), a leading Islamist institution in the United Kingdom. Titled
Towards Greater Understanding, it advises British authorities on how to deal with Muslim
students in taxpayer-funded schools.
The MCB seeks to create an environment in schools in which Muslim children do not make
"inappropriate assumptions" that "to progress in society they will have to compromise or give up
aspects of who they are, and their religious beliefs and values." Toward this end, the MCB
proposes a jaw-dropping list of changes that would fundamentally alter the nature of British
schools, transforming them, in effect, into Saudi-like institutions. Some of its suggestions:
* Prayers: Provide (1) extra "water cans or bottles" for washing before the prayers and
(2) prayer facilities, ideally separate ones for boys and girls. Schools should also make
available "a suitable external visitor, a teacher or an older pupil" to lead the communal
Friday prayers and give the sermon.
* Toilets: Water available in water cans or bottles for cleansing purposes.
* Social customs: No pressure to shake hands with members of the opposite sex,
whether students or teachers.
* Scheduling: Vacation days for all on the two major Muslim holidays, the Eids.
* Holiday celebrations: Involve non-Muslim students and their parents in Islamic holiday
rituals. During Ramadan, for instance, all children, not just Muslim ones, should
celebrate "the spirit and values of Ramadan through collective worship or assembly
themes and communal Iftar (the breaking of the fast)."
* Ramadan: (1) No examinations during this month, "since the combination of preparing
for exams and fasting may prove challenging for some pupils" and (2) no sex education,
to respect strictures against sex during that month.
* Food: Provide halal meals. Permit students to eat with their right hands.
* Clothing: Accede to the wearing of hijabs and even jilbabs (a long outer garment down
to the ankles). In swimming pools, Muslim children should wear modest swimwear
(e.g., for girls, full leotards and leggings). Islamic amulets must be permitted.
* Beards: A right for male students.
* Sports: Sex-segregation where there is physical contact with other team players, as in
basketball and football, or when exposed, as in swimming.
* Shower rooms: Separate stalls needed, so Muslims are not subject to the "profound
indignity" of seeing or being seen in the nude.
* Music: Should be limited to "the human voice and non-tuneable percussion instruments
such as drums."
* Dancing: Excluded, unless it is done in a single-sex environment and does not "involve
sexual connotations and messages."
* Teacher and administrator training: Staff should undergo Islamic "awareness training"
so that schools are "better informed and have greater and more accurate appreciation of
their Muslim pupils' needs."
* Art: Exempt Muslim pupils from producing "three dimensional figurative imagery of
humans."’
* Religious instruction: Pictures of any prophets (including Jesus) prohibited.
* Language instruction: Arabic should be made available to all Muslim students.
* Islamic civilization: (1) Study the contribution of Muslims to Europe in history, art,
mathematics, and science classes and (2) emphasize common aspects of European and
Islamic heritage.
One response to the Muslim Council of Britain booklet.
The imposition, explicit or implicit, of Rushdie Rules would render impossible any criticism of a
program such as the MCB's. I could not write this article, Commentary could not publish it, and
you could not read it.
Overhauling schools is just one of a myriad of planned changes. Step by step, piece by piece,
Islamists wish to trump the premises of Western life by infusing its education, cultural life, and
institutions with a concurrent Islamic system that in time overrides secular institutions, until an
Islamic order comes operationally into being. Some changes are already in place and extend to
many aspects of life. A few pungent examples:
Polygamous marriages are valid under certain circumstances in the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Australia, and the Canadian province of Ontario.
Muslim women-only swimming sessions exist in municipal pools in Washington State. Women-only classes are
being offered at Virginia Tech, a taxpayer-supported university.
Women can have their drivers license photographs taken wearing hijabs in three U.S. states.
If they work at IKEA or for the London police, women can wear branded hijabs provided by their employers.
Piggybanks have been banned as a symbol of saving at two major British banks.
"Any matter containing religious materials contrary to Islamic faith" may not be sent via the U.S. postal
system to soldiers serving in the Middle East.
Medical personnel may not eat or drink in the presence of Muslim patients or colleagues during the month of Ramadan in a Scottish hospital.
The City of Boston sold public land at a discount price to build an Islamic institution.
IKEA, the furnishings store, provides branded hijabs for employees in Great Britain.
These steps, large and small, toward Islamization undermine Western values and mores. They
are unacceptable:
Muslims are entitled to equal rights and responsibilities but not to special privileges.
They must fit into the existing order, not remake Western societies in the Islamist
mold.
Increasing freedom is welcome, regressing to the medieval norms of the Shari'a is not.
In retrospect, responses to the Rushdie edict among intellectuals and politicians in 1989 were
noteworthy for the support for the imperiled novelist, especially on the left. Leftist intellectuals
were more likely to stand by him (Susan Sontag: "our integrity as a nation is as endangered by
an attack on a writer as on an oil tanker") than were those on the right (Patrick Buchanan: "we
should shove his blasphemous little novel out into the cold"). But times have changed: Paul
Berman recently published a book, The Flight of the Intellectuals, that excoriates his fellow
liberals for (as the dust jacket puts it) having "fumbled badly in their effort to grapple with
Islamist ideas and violence."
At the time, François Mitterrand, the socialist president of France, called the threat to Rushdie
an "absolute evil." The Green Party in Germany sought to break all economic agreements with
Iran. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the German foreign minister, endorsed a European Union
resolution supporting Rushdie as "a signal to assure the preservation of civilization and human
values." The U.S. Senate unanimously passed a resolution that declared its commitment "to
protect the right of any person to write, publish, sell, buy, and read books without fear of
intimidation and violence" and condemned Khomeini's threat as "state-sponsored terrorism."
Such governmental responses are inconceivable in 2010.
For every exercise in free speech since 1989, such as the Danish Muhammad cartoons or the
no-holds-barred studies of Islam published by Prometheus Books, uncountable legions of
writers, publishers, and illustrators have shied away from expressing themselves. Two examples:
Paramount Pictures replaced the Hamas-like terrorists of Tom Clancy's novel The Sum of All
Fears with European neo-Nazis in its movie version of the story. And Yale University Press
published a book on the Danish cartoon crisis without permitting the cartoons to be reproduced
in the study.
The reasoning of those who capitulate is as unexceptional as it is dismal: "This decision was
based solely on concern for public safety"; "the safety and security of our customers and
employees is a top priority"; "I feel real fear that someone will slit my throat"; "If I would have
said what I actually think about Islam, I wouldn't be in this world for long"; and "'If this goes
down badly, I'm writing my own death warrant."
Changes since 1989 result mainly from the growth of three isms: multiculturalism, left-fascism,
and Islamism. The multicultural impulse regards no way of life, belief system, or political
philosophy better or worse than any other. Just as Italian and Japanese food are both delicious
and filling, so environmentalism or Wicca offer equally valid alternatives to Judeo-Christian
civilization. Why fight for one's way of life when it has no claim to superiority over any other?
But perhaps one way is worse: if Western imperialism and the white race pollute the world, who
wants Western civilization? A sizable movement of left-fascists, led by Hugo Chávez, sees
Western power, which they call "Empire," as the world's main threat, with the United States and
Israel viewed as the chief offenders.
Islamism has grown spectacularly since 1989, becoming the most powerful form of radical
utopianism, forming an alliance with the left, dominating civil societies, challenging many
governments and taking over others, establishing a beachhead in the West, and smartly
advancing its agenda in international institutions.
The yin of Western weakness, in short, has met with the yang of Islamist assertion. Defenders of
Western civilization must fight not just Islamists but also the multiculturalists who enable them
and the leftists who ally with them.
Mr. Pipes is director of the Middle East Forum, Taube distinguished visiting fellow at the
Hoover Institution of Stanford University, and a columnist at National Review. He
delivered an earlier version of this text on receiving an award from the Danish Free
Speech Society.
Several important developments took place right after my article, "Two Decades of the Rushdie
Rules," went to press,:
(1) Pastor Terry Jones of Gainesville, Florida planned to burn hundreds of Korans on Sep. 11,
but then submitted to pressure and canceled the bonfire. When his intention became
international news, it lead, according to established pattern, to unrest and threats in the Muslim
world and to at least 18 deaths (5 in Afghanistan, 13 in Kashmir). Under pressure from U.S.
government officials, Jones relented and did not burn Korans.
I argued in a column, "'Rushdie Rules' Reach Florida," that the novelty and significance of this
incident lies in the full weight of the U.S. government, from Barack Obama on down, bearing
down on Jones. In distinct contrast to Margaret Thatcher in 1989, when the Rushdie affair
broke, or Anders Fogh Rasmussen in 2006, when the Danish cartoon affair occurred, American
authorities took upon themselves the role of protectors of Islam and executors of the Shari'a. In
so doing, they extended the Rushdie Rules to the United States.
Mollie Norris' cartoon that ended her normal life and began her "ghost" existence.
(2) Mollie Norris, the cartoonist who devised "Everyone Draw Muhammad Day" went into
hiding. As her editor, Mark D. Fefer, at the Seattle Weekly put it,
You may have noticed that Molly Norris' comic is not in the paper this week. That's because
there is no more Molly. The gifted artist is alive and well, thankfully. But on the insistence of top
security specialists at the FBI, she is, as they put it, "going ghost": moving, changing her name,
and essentially wiping away her identity. She will no longer be publishing cartoons in our paper
or in City Arts magazine, where she has been a regular contributor. She is, in effect, being put
into a witness-protection program—except, as she notes, without the government picking up the
tab. It's all because of the appalling fatwa issued against her this summer, following her infamous
"Everybody Draw Mohammed Day" cartoon.
That "appalling fatwa" was posted in July by Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen who lives in
Yemen. He wrote:
A cartoonist out of Seattle, Washington, named Molly Norris started the 'Everybody Draw
Mohammed Day'. This snowball rolled out from between her evil fingers. She should be taken
as a prime target of assassination along with others who participated in her campaign. This
campaign is not a practice of freedom of speech, but is a nationwide mass movement of
Americans joining their European counterparts in going out of their way to offend Muslims
worldwide. They are expressing their hatred of the Messenger of Islam through ridicule
Katherine Kersten discusses the American response to this outrage:
Surely, you say, American journalists and media moguls—always staunch defenders of the First
Amendment—are proclaiming outrage and rallying round this young woman? On the contrary.
The media have largely been silent about her nightmarish plight. When the Washington
Examiner, an on-line newspaper in Washington, D.C., asked the American Society of News
Editors for a statement about Norris, none was forthcoming. Ditto for the Society of
Professional Journalists. This, despite the fact that the editors group's mission statement extols
"the First Amendment at home and free speech around the world," while the journalists claim to
stand for "the perpetuation of the free press as the cornerstone of our nation and liberty."
This incident suggests that Awlaki has the power to turn any American's life upside down by
simply uttering a threat against him. This is no longer a battle of giants, Khomeini v. Rushdie, but
of pygmies, Awlaki v. Norris. One can imagine the threats proliferating so that any person
critical of "Islam, the Prophet, and the Koran" will be in danger of having to "go ghost."
(3) Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Daniel Huff proposed an important reply to some of the wanton threats
against Americans in "It's Time to Fight Back Against Death Threats by Islamic Extremists," Los
Angeles Times, Sep. 27:
It's time for free-speech advocates to take a page from the abortion rights movement's
playbook. In the 1990s, abortion providers faced the same sort of intimidation tactics and did
not succumb. Instead, they lobbied for a federal law making it a crime to threaten people
exercising reproductive rights and permitting victims to sue for damages. The Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act, or FACE, passed in 1994 by solid bipartisan margins. A similar
act is needed to cover threats against free-speech rights.
A federal law would do two things. First, it would deter violent tactics, by focusing national
attention on the problem and invoking the formidable enforcement apparatus of the federal
government. Second, its civil damages provision would empower victims of intimidation to act
as private attorneys general to defend their rights. …
Existing state laws prohibiting intimidation are inadequate. On the criminal side, the heightened
standard of proof deters prosecutors from investing scarce resources. Explicit grounds for a civil
action do not always exist, and damages can be difficult to quantify. By contrast, the FACE
Act, which provides the model for the proposed legislation, lets victims opt for preset damages.
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